

Fort Ord Munitions Response Site (MRS) Security Program

Annual Report 2005

By:

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background As a result of the Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1988 (Public Law 100-526) and the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Public Law 100-510), Fort Ord is now closed. The process of disposal and reuse of the installation property began in 1994. As part of the disposal and reuse process, the Army began work to remove Munitions and Explosives of Concern (MEC) from the former Fort Ord to reduce the explosive threat to the community and to support property transfer after base closure. Areas containing MEC will be eligible for reuse when the MEC has been removed to a level suitable for the designated reuse.

The Munitions Response Site (MRS) Security Program (also known as the Ordnance and Explosives (OE) Site Security Program) was established in 2001 to:

- Document the status of MRS on the former Fort Ord.
- Document the measures implemented to advise/inform the public about the possible hazards of MEC;
- Document MRS security measures taken to prohibit/prevent public access to those MRS that pose an explosive threat to the community (Restricted MRS);
- Document a process for periodically reviewing and updating the program.

The Fort Ord MRS (OE Site) Security Committee was established in 2001 to review the above actions and recommend the addition and/or modification of site security actions.

This report complies with the Fort Ord MRS Security Program requirement for a yearly report summarizing and evaluating trespass reports and Munitions and Explosives of Concern (MEC) incident reports. This report also provides or refers to records of actions taken and planned by the Army in accordance with the Fort Ord MRS Security Program. The Army's response to the annual analysis of MEC and security data and the recommendations for additional actions by the MRS Security Program Committee for the year 2005 are included in this report.

1.2 Changes in Terminology There have been changes in many definitions related to actions and items associated with the Department of Defense Military Munitions Response Program (MMRP) in 2003. For a summary of those changes as dictated by in Department of Defense correspondence, December 18, 2003 see Appendix A, MUNITIONS RESPONSE SITE (MRS) SECURITY PROGRAM, FORMER FORT ORD, April 2005. This report and related materials utilize the new MMRP terminology.

1.3 MRS Security Program Committee Annual Meeting The Fort Ord MRS Security Program Committee met on February 23, 2006 (attachment 1) to review site security information for the year 2005 and to provide recommendations for changes to current site security measures. See paragraphs 3.3, 4.3, and 6.0.

2.0 MODIFICATIONS TO PHYSICAL SECURITY ACTIONS FOR MUNITIONS RESPONSE SITES (MRS)

2.1 Changes to Perimeter Fence and Inspections On April 21, 2005, evidence of a trespass (tracks from a culvert passing under the perimeter fence) in the impact area (MRS-BLM) (attachment 2) was reported by an MMRP crew. The evidence of trespass was associated with the reported disappearance of a MEC item (2.36 inch high explosive anti-tank rocket) that had been located during MEC removal activities and had been left in place (buried) pending detonation. Local police and federal investigators responded, collected physical evidence, and interviewed associated personnel. Although the MEC item was later discovered at another location within the MRS-BLM perimeter fence, a review of site security procedures for MRS-BLM by the Presidio of Monterey Police, USACE, and Fort Ord BRAC MMRP staff was conducted in response to the incident and resulted in implementation of changes in the configuration of the MRS-BLM perimeter fencing and MRS security procedures:

- An inspection of the MRS-BLM perimeter fence was conducted to identify locations similar to that identified as the point of access identified in the 21 April trespass report (confluence of a surface water culvert and the MRS-BLM perimeter fence). Fencing at culverts and similar areas around MRS-BLM was modified (additional strand(s) added) to cover the opening the extent possible without creating potential erosion situations or increasing the hazard for wildlife.
- During the security review and fence inspection, evidence of previous trespass was identified in other areas within and surrounding MRS-BLM April 25 (2), April 27, May 13, and May 21. In response to this evidence, a system of regular inspections of the MRS-BLM perimeter fence was implemented to attempt to identify and adjust entry points and potential weaknesses in the perimeter fence.
- Deficiencies in the perimeter fence identified during an inspection are repaired immediately if possible, or a temporary repair is done and the situation noted. The results are reported to the BLM, USACE, and POM PD. Necessary permanent repairs are made by crews from the BLM or USACE contractors.
- Changes were also made to procedures in relocating and treating MEC items discovered during removal procedures.

3.0 TRESPASS INCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEM Under the MRS Security Program, a description of incidents involving trespass in areas designated as restricted due to the presence of MEC is recorded by the responding agency and provided to the MRS Security Manager. These descriptions, the agency response, and other actions taken are recorded for annual analysis by the MRS Security Program Committee as to frequency, trends, and indications of weaknesses in the MRS security program. (Paragraph 4.3.1 Trespassing Incident Reporting, MUNITIONS RESPONSE SITE

(MRS) SECURITY PROGRAM (FORMERLY ORDNANCE AND EXPLOSIVES (OE) SITE SECURITY 2002 PROGRAM SUMMARY), FORMER FORT ORD, April 2005)

3.1 Trespass Incident Report 2005 (Attachment 3) There were eight reported evidence of trespass incidents around or in MRS-BLM of the former Fort Ord during the 2005 calendar year. No persons were apprehended for acts associated with trespass. Three incidents involved the discovery of slack in portions of the perimeter fence by Army, contractor, or BLM staff and evidence of an associated trail or tracks within MRS-BLM. Two incidents involved the discovery of tracks within MRS-BLM without a discernable entry points. One incident involved apparent entry under the MRS-BLM fence using a culvert, leaving tracks, and associated with the disappearance of a 2.36 inch anti-tank rocket from the area that was later recovered (see paragraph 2.1). One incident involved the cutting of the third fence wire and a trail leading away from the site. One incident involved the use of stolen heavy equipment (tractor) to breakdown an impact area range gate and the subsequent destruction of contractor equipment inside the restricted MRS-Ranges 43-48.

3.2 Trends Analysis Prevalent trespassing evidence remains the dislodging of one or more of the wires of the MRS-BLM perimeter fence with a discernable trail. A prevalent location this trespass evidence remains the fence line in areas without concertina wire backup (east side). Since the evidence of these incidents is similar to that of animal entanglement, it remains possible that at least some of these incidents can be attributed to animals moving through the fence. The most prevalent location for trespass remains the fence line adjacent to local communities and Laguna Seca.

3.3 MRS Security Program Committee Recommendations for Additional Work/Security Measures Reference Trespass During the annual meeting of the MRS Security Program Committee recommendations for additional MRS work and trespass prevention measures were collected and discussed.

Members of the Committee expressed interest in a recommendation by the BLM member that an assessment and removal of MEC danger and other inappropriately restrictive signs within areas where a surface MEC danger is negligible (Level C security areas).

The POM Directorate of Emergency Services representative suggested that resources and procedures for enforcement of no trespass areas, including patrolling, continue to be assessed.

The CSUMB Police representative recommended stepped up patrolling of restricted MRS.

It was the Committee's recommendation that prescribed burn and MEC safety exclusion zones in the vicinity of MRS-16 be announced to interested Committee members. The Army agreed to provide email/letter notice to interested members.

3.3.1 Action on Previous Recommendations A Committee recommendation to use periodic photographs to identify new graffiti on existing range structures within MRS-BLM was initiated in 2005 (see MRS Security Program Committee Meeting, February 16, 2005). New graffiti would be considered evidence of trespass. No new graffiti marking were identified during 2005 using this procedure. This program will be continued through CY 2006 and then be reassessed by the MRS Security Program Committee.

4.0 MEC INCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEM

The Army has established a process for reporting, responding to, and documenting the discovery of MEC items or related scrap at the former Fort Ord. Information concerning the discovery of MEC or related items is disseminated IAW the MRS Security Program and recorded in database suitable for analysis of reported information. This process allows the identification of trends in location of items, type of items, circumstances under which items are found. Other information recorded includes the responding agency, the determination of the type and amount of item(s) found, and the final disposition of the item(s). (Paragraph 4.3.2 MEC Incident Reporting, MUNITIONS RESPONSE SITE (MRS) SECURITY PROGRAM (FORMERLY ORDNANCE AND EXPLOSIVES (OE) SITE SECURITY 2002 PROGRAM SUMMARY), FORMER FORT ORD, April 2005)

4.1 MEC Incidents 2005 (Attachment 4) There were nine MEC incidents reported in 2005. Four reports were submitted by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), three involved environmental cleanup contractors, and two were initiated by contractors involved in property redevelopment. Seven of the 2005 MEC incidents occurred outside MRS. All incident items were determined to be expended munitions (debris) (MDE), munitions debris (pieces) (MD), or discarded military munitions (DMM). No unexploded ordnance (UXO) was involved. All reported 2005 MEC incidents were initiated using the published reporting system and disposed of in accordance with explosives safety standards and MRS Security Program guidance.

4.2 Trend Analysis An analysis of reported MEC incidents 1998 to 2005 supports a previously identified trend in the discovery of discarded and expended training munitions as well as other munitions debris in the areas under redevelopment as well as those that continue to be managed by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). The likely contributions to this trend is the increased use by the public and expanded application of BLM work crews in areas historically used by U.S. Army training and infantry units for maneuver training involving the transport and expenditure of training munitions and devices. The types and locations of reported munitions debris, discarded munitions, and expended training munitions continues to confirm Army risk analysis including known and suspected land use and the type and intensity of reuse. No other trends have been identified.

4.3 MRS Security Program Committee Recommendations for Additional Work/Security Measures Reference MEC Incidents During the annual meeting of the MRS Security Program Committee recommendations for additional MRS work and MEC incident prevention measures are collected and discussed. See Attachment 1.

4.3.1 Action on Previous Recommendations Army continued current levels of security.

5.0 MEC RECOGNITION AND SAFETY PROGRAMS As a basewide effort to promote public safety and because of the history of the former Fort Ord as an infantry training base, the Army provides a MEC safety program for local schools and interested community groups. Munitions and Explosives of Concern recognition and safety training is also provided in the interested of public safety and in accordance with a Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabilities Act Record of Decision on an as needed basis to municipal service providers, redevelopment contractors, property owners, managers and their employees upon request. These programs are announced through the Fort Ord BRAC community relations office, as a flyer available at community events, through directed mailings, and on the cleanup website.

5.1 MEC Safety Program for Schools The Fort Ord BRAC community relations office announces and coordinates a MEC safety program annually with local schools with the objective of providing school age children of the area with the ability to:

- Visually recognize the attributes of various MEC items that they could possibly encounter as a result of their proximity to former weapons training ranges
- Associate the danger inherent in exposure to these items
- Remember the actions to protect themselves and others when they suspect or encounter a possible MEC item.

5.1.1 School Year 2005-2006 Twenty-six local schools were invited to participate in the Fort Ord Munitions Safety Program during the 2005-2006 school year (September 05 – May 06). Invitations were sent to all in September 05. A follow up phone call, prior to the end of the school year, is used to remind schools that have not participated of availability of the program. Copies of the invitations, presentation information, and records of follow up actions were submitted to the project administrative record.

Three schools participated in the program in CY 2005. A total of 834 students and 19 teachers and staff attended the presentations.

5.2 Property Owner and Contractor MEC Recognition and Safety Training

Property owners, contractors, and others that may be involved in intrusive activities at the former Fort Ord are invited via the cleanup website, and those made know to the Army via direct mail, to attend training to increase their awareness of, and ability to identify, MEC items. This training is mandatory for all personnel before entry of a restricted MRS (Appendix G, Fort Ord MRS Security Program) regardless of the intended activity.

5.2.1 Training – 2005 A total of 272 personnel including, contractors, municipal service providers, fire, police, and media personnel, and regional environmental agency staff, as well as volunteers and employees of conservation and recreation groups were recorded as participating in the Fort Ord MEC Recognition and Safety Training in CY 2005. No

training was requested in CY 2005 from individuals or entities identified as Track 1 parcel recipients or their representatives. A copy of Fort Ord MEC Recognition and Safety training records for CY 2005 was submitted to the project administrative record.

6.0 MANAGEMENT CONTROLS FOR TRACK 1 MRS No notice of intrusive actions on Track 1 parcels was received in CY 2005. No MEC incidents were reported on Track 1 parcels in CY 2005. Therefore, no plans were developed for follow-on actions in response to MEC incidents on Track 1 parcels in CY 2005.

7.0 PLANNED SITE SECURITY ACTIONS FOR 2006 In a continuing effort to accomplish the MRS security mission, and in response to recommendations from the MRS Security Program Committee and other community members in regards to Fort Ord MRS security, the Army will pursue the several actions in CY 2006. Estimated completion dates are noted where applicable. All other actions may be considered ongoing. The status of ongoing actions will be reported to the MRS Security Committee at the annual meeting. During the year 2006, the Army will:

- Continue to work with the POM Directorate of Emergency Services in improving the effectiveness of patrolling and other restricted MRS enforcement. The current schedule of twice daily patrols of restricted MRS parameters will be examined in to identify resources to expand the patrolling schedule of restricted MRS.
- Direct resources to monitor geo cache websites for indications of caches in restricted MRS. Take appropriate action if a cache is determined to be in restricted MRS. Report results of monitoring and actions taken to the Committee at the next meeting.
- Provide notice to the community concerning the establishment of temporary MEC safety exclusion zones (MRS-16) through the Fort Ord environmental cleanup advisory system (local flyer distribution and website posting). An announcement of all MEC removal exclusion zone notices will be provided to interested Committee members via email/phone prior to their implementation.
- Cooperate with the BLM and USACE ordnance safety staff to initiate a review of the propriety and disposition of munitions related signs on former and current Fort Ord lands outside restricted MRS. The intent of the review is to identify and remove inappropriate signs and develop a public safety notice that is appropriate for the current use of those lands. Report the progress of this review to the Committee at the next meeting.
- Distribute to the Committee a description of changes to site security status or operations resulting from future incident analysis, property transfer, or planned MEC removal work in 2006.
- Maintain fences, signs and gates around restricted MR sites as needed.

- Publish and distribute brochures, pamphlets, and fact sheets describing the hazards of MEC as needed.
- Conduct the School MEC Safety Program for school year 2006.
- Maintain instructive and warning display boards as needed.
- Conduct MEC recognition and safety training for workers, emergency and municipal service providers, contractors, and other personnel engaged in service, survey, construction, or demolition activities on the former Fort Ord.
- Continue the current reporting and monitoring programs associated with the MMRP.

Attachment 1

Summary
Fort Ord Environmental Cleanup
Site Security Committee Meeting
23 February 2006
BRAC Conference Room

Attendees

Gail Youngblood, Chair, FO BRAC
Wes Trescott, Member, POM SJA
Lyle Shurtleff, Committee Administrator, FO BRAC
Patricia Ryan, Member, POM Public Affairs
Jim Laughlin, Member, Directorate of Emergency Services
Claire Trombadore, Member, EPA, (phone)
Andrew Cardinali, Member, POM RCI
Roman Racca, Member, DTSC, (phone)
Kevin Siemann, MMRP Contractor Representative, Shaw E&I
Eric Morgan, Member, Fort Ord Region BLM
Eric Lawson, Member, CSUMB Police Department
Lt. Bob Nolan, Member, Marina Police Department

KEY POINTS:

- The Army will continue all elements of the current Munitions Response Site (MRS) Security Program through 2006.
- There were eight reported evidence of trespass or trespassing incidents in 2005.
- There were ten reported Munitions and Explosives of Concern (MEC) incidents in 2005.
- There were no Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) items reported in 2005.
- All known 2005 MEC incidents were reported and disposed using procedures published in the Fort Ord MRS Security Program.

2005 Site Security Update

The Administrator provided Committee members an update on the Fort Ord MRS Security Program, recent cleanup events, and pending property transfers.

On April 21, 2005, evidence of a trespass in the impact area was reported by an MMRP crew. The evidence of trespass was associated with the disappearance of a 2.36 inch high explosive anti-tank rocket that had been located during removal activities and had been left in place (buried) pending detonation. Local police and federal investigators responded, collected physical evidence, and interviewed associated personnel. Although the UXO item was later discovered at another location within the impact area, a review of site security procedures for the impact area by the Presidio of Monterey Police, USACE, and Fort Ord BRAC MMRP staff was conducted in response to the trespass report. This review resulted in some changes in the configuration of the impact area fencing and MRS security procedures:

- An inspection of the impact area perimeter fence was conducted to identify locations similar to that identified as the point of access identified in the 21 April trespass report (confluence of a surface water culvert and the impact area fence). Fencing in similar areas around the impact area was modified to improve the barrier.

- During the security review and fence inspection, evidence of previous trespass was identified in other areas within and surrounding the impact area April 25 (2), April 27, May 13, and May 21. In response to this evidence, a system of regular inspections of the impact area fence was implemented to attempt to identify and adjust entry points and potential weaknesses in the barrier system.
- Deficiencies in the perimeter fence identified during an inspection are repaired immediately if possible, or a temporary repair is done and the situation noted. The results are reported to the BLM, USACE, and POM PD. Necessary permanent repairs are made by crews from the BLM.

Current (2005) MRS Security Issues

The Administrator provided members with a description of ongoing site security issues. Those issues are:

- Assessment of Munitions and Explosives of Concern security actions necessary in areas of interface between pending MEC removal areas and transferred or transferring property.
- Assessment of suitable patrolling and related methods for enforcing access restrictions in Site Security Level A MRS.

A map of likely transferred and transferring property interface areas was distributed. Issues concerning multiple public safety agency jurisdictions in areas of planned property transfer were discussed.

NEW MRS Security Issues

The Administrator outlined the planned prescribed burn and MEC safety exclusion zones for pedestrians and cyclists in vicinity of MRS-16 planned for implementation during the 2006 prescribed burn and subsequent MEC removal operations. Some Committee members expressed an interest in information concerning plans for public notification of these exclusion zones. The dissemination of information concerning the prescribed burn exclusion zone was described as under the control of the Incident Commander (Chief), POM Fire Department.

The BLM member described geo cache activities as increasing on BLM lands and a potential concern for restricted MRS security. Committee members considered options to assess the potential for this activity to encourage trespass in restricted MRS.

The BLM member offered that munitions related signs occur on current and former Fort Ord property with obsolete and conflicting information concerning restriction in the use and munitions safety status of the property.

The EPA member suggested that the property containing all or a portion of a MRS that is subject to early transfer should remain under the BRAC MRS security program until all applicable CERCLA actions have been completed. The Chair suggested that those elements of the BRAC MRS security program, involving recognition and safety training should remain in effect at least until the CERCLA covenant deferral for the subject property is lifted. Responsibilities for

implementation of a post property transfer MRS security program should be detailed within the property transfer documentation.

Committee Analysis of 2005 MEC Incident

The Administrator provided an update to the MEC incident reporting system. The 2005 incidents were described as involving only inert, expended or discarded MEC items (no UXO). The occurrence of seventy percent of 2005 MEC incidents outside established MRS was noted for the Committee's consideration. An informal Fort Ord BRAC investigation of a recent MEC related incident was described as indicating that some contract workers on recently transferred property and new employees within the POM staff were not aware of the Fort Ord MEC incident reporting system. Committee members considered options for ensuring that new staff is aware of Fort Ord MEC incident reporting requirements. The Fort Ord BRAC office will continue to identify opportunities to educate all those involved in intrusive activities on the former Fort Ord concerning MEC recognition and safety.

Munitions and Explosives of Concern incident data for 2005 was presented as indicative of a continuing trend in the discovery of Munitions Debris (MD) including expended training munitions in the public land areas managed by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and others as reuse expands and land management operations continue. The likely contributions to this trend were an increase in construction and other reuse activities in areas historical use of the areas transited by infantry units and/or used for maneuver training involving training munitions. Other possible contributing factors were described as the increased use of those areas by hikers, bikers, and equestrians, as well as the presence of numerous work crews involved in redevelopment, municipal services, trail improvement, weed abatement, and habitat restoration. The types and locations of reported MD and Discard Military Munitions (DMM) confirm previous Army risk analysis including known and suspected land use and the type and intensity of reuse. An increase in reports from work crews in non-MRS areas was noted as proportional to the increase in redevelopment and municipal service maintenance related activities.

Committee Analysis of 2005 Trespass Data

Evidence of, and trespass data reported in 2005 was presented. The Committee noted a significant increase in the number incidents in restricted MRS. The Fort Ord BRAC Office response to that increase was described as including the weekly inspection of barriers, notice and dangers signs as well as the reinforcement, and an increase in the observation of, likely access points. The implementation of weekly barrier inspections has also identified and addressed some needed repairs to restricted MRS fences and signs.

Update on Previous Committee Recommended Actions

The Army provided an assessment of the monitoring of gang tag/graffiti on range structures within restricted MRS as an indicator of trespass. Comparison of photos of gang tags/graffiti on range structures does not indicate that tagging is ongoing within restricted MRS. The Army will continue photo monitoring of existing gang tag/graffiti sites, respond to new activities, and provide an update at the next Committee meeting.

Committee Recommendations for Future Actions

Members of the Committee expressed interest in recommendation by the BLM member that an assessment and removal of MEC danger and other inappropriately restrictive signs within areas where a surface UXO danger is negligible (Level C security areas). The Army agreed to provide the Committee with an assessment of the need for public notice in Level C areas controlled by the Army as well as a plan for the replacement of, or removal of existing danger/restrictive signs in those areas as appropriate. The BLM will conduct an assessment of similar areas under its management and coordinate possible adjustments to area signs with the Fort Ord BRAC Office.

The POM Directorate of Emergency Services representative suggested that resources and procedures for enforcement of no trespass areas, including patrolling, continue to be assessed. The Army agreed to continue this assessment.

The CSUMB Police representative recommended stepped up patrolling of restricted MRS. The Army agreed to work with the POM Directorate of Emergency Services in identifying resources for increasing patrolling in the vicinity of restricted MRS.

It was the Committee's recommendation that prescribed burn and MEC safety exclusion zones in the vicinity of MRS-16 be announced to interested Committee members. The Army agreed to provide email/letter notice to interested members.

Planned MRS Security Actions for 2006

The Fort Ord BRAC Office will continue to work with the POM Directorate of Emergency Services in improving the effectiveness of patrols and other restricted MRS enforcement.

Fort Ord BRAC Office will direct resources to monitor geo cache websites for indications of caches in restricted MRS. Appropriate action will be taken if a cache is determined to be in restricted MRS. A report will be provided to the Committee at the next meeting.

The Fort Ord BRAC Office will provide notice to the community concerning the establishment of temporary MEC safety exclusion zones through the Fort Ord environmental cleanup advisory system (local flyer distribution and website posting). An announcement of all MEC removal exclusion zone notices will be provided to interested Committee members via email/phone.

The Fort Ord BRAC Office in cooperation with the BLM and USACE ordnance safety staff will initiate a review of the propriety and disposition of munitions related signs on former and current Fort Ord lands. The intent of review is to remove inappropriate signs, and develop a system of signs that best reflect the status of those properties.


The Fort Ord BRAC Office will distribute to the Committee a description of changes to site security status or operations resulting from future incident analysis, property transfer, or planned MEC removal work in 2006.

The Committee was adjourned with the next meeting scheduled for February 2007 on a date to be determined.


vls

Attachment 2

Former Fort Ord
MMRP Investigations
Plate 1



- FORT ORD BOUNDARY
- MUNITIONS RESPONSE SITES
- REMOVALS AND SAMPLING
- SURFACE CLEARANCE**
- (ACCESSIBLE AREAS ONLY)
- FACILITIES



FORMER FORT ORD
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

PRINT DATE: Apr 14, 2006 at 9:52 A.M	SOURCE OF DATA: FortOrd MMRP Database
AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY: Cary A. Stebel@usace.army.mil	SCALE: As Shown on Map
FILE: GIS_P_rjfc06MM_Sec01R/Removals 6-4-06.mxd	

Attachment 3

1998-2005 Trespassing Incidents

Incident Date	Range Name	MPR	Location	Suspects	Disposition
1/3/1998	48	21-98	Range 48	NA	Damaged fence, cut barbed wire, fresh vehicle tracks.
1/4/1998	22	21-98	Range 22	NA	Gate lock cut, no signs of fresh tracks.
1/6/1998	48	21-98	Range 48	Adult Male (age 35)	Alcohol involved. 2/17/98 U.S. Magistrate court fined suspect \$100.
6/6/1998	26	NA	Range 26	Adult Male	Homeless male living in tent inside MRA.
9/17/1998	42	01565-98-MPC036	Eucalyptus rd. .7 mi E of Parker Flats Rd.	Adult Male	Male hunter climbed over barbed wire fence. Police confiscated deer. Suspect sent to U.S. Magistrate Court. Out come unknown.
0/31/1998	23	01686-98-MPC036	Range 23 Tower	3 Adult Males	Drugs involved
2/1/1999	45	NA	Range 45	4 Juveniles	Kids trespassing. Took practice 40mm rifle grenades to Fitch Middle School.
2/1/1999	45	NA	Range 45	Juvenile	Thirty (30) practice 40mm rifle grenades recovered from a child's home in Seaside.
5/6/1999	27	00639-99	Range 27	2 Adult Males (Ages 27 & 31)	USA Environmental Reported. 1st offense, waring issued. Riding bicycles.
0/18/1999	21	01459-99	Range 21	5 Males (Ages 14, 16 and three 18)	POM Police routine patrol. Suspects "just looking around".

Incident Date	Range Name	MPR	Location	Suspects	Disposition
1/13/1999	22	01578-99	Range 22	Adult Male (age 18)	Reported by BLM. Drugs involved. Sent to U.S. Magistrate Court on 12/14/99. Fined \$50 for drugs, trespassing dismissed.
4/10/2000	NA	00572-00-MPC036	Between Ranges 21 & 23	Adult Male (age 33)	Reported by USA Environmental. Ducked under barbed wire fence next to chain linked gate to walk dogs. U.S. Magistrate Court on 5/15/00, outcome unknow.
2/18/2000	27A	N/A	Range 27A	Adult Male	Reported by USA Environmental. Climbed through fence to walk dog. Individual left area when requested. Courtesy call to POM Police. Contractor instructed to call POM Police immediately for citation.
1/16/2001	27A	N/A	Range 27A	2 Young Adult Males (early 20's)	OE contractor saw two males entered the MRA @ range 27A on foot and were playing paint ball. POM police called but suspects fled on foot and were not apprehended.
1/31/2001	29	N/A	Range 29 vicinity	N/A	BLM discovered during their routine patrol that fence had been cut and they had repaired it.
1/31/2001	26	N/A	Range 26 vicinity	N/A	BLM discovered during their routine patrol that fence had been cut and they had repaired it.
2/6/2001	19	N/A	Range 19	N/A	BLM discovered during their routine patrol that fence had been stretched and cut and they had repaired it. Suspect someone is feeding a coyote or dog because of evidence of food inside fence.

Incident Date	Range Name	MPR	Location	Suspects	Disposition
3/5/2001	30	N/A	Range 30	N/A	BLM discovered during their routine patrol that one wire had been broken. Extensive vegetation clearance for firebreak is being conducted. Per conversation on 3/15, Denny suspects that any fence damage along South Boundary where they are clearing vegeta
3/5/2001	29	N/A	Range 29	N/A	BLM discovered during their routine patrol that barbed wire fence next to gate was loose. Clips that were missing have been replaced and wire has been tightened. See note above on incident #20.
4/16/2001	30	N/A	RANGE 30 GATE	N/A	BROKEN WIRE (REPAIRED) 5/7/01 COULD HAVE BEEN DUE TO FIREBREAK VEGETATION CLEARANCE
6/27/2001	21	N/A	Range 21	N/A	Structure Fire east of Gen. Jim Blvd
7/18/2001	39	N/A	Range 39 MRA	N/A	OE contractor discovered bicycle tracks, Watkins Gate, Chinook Road, Hawkeye, Impossible Canyon, Steep Road, Wildcat Ridge
7/25/2001	29	N/A	Range 29	N/A	BLM discovered during weekly patrol, left side of gate, top wire had been cut
7/25/2001	29	N/A	Range 29	N/A	Cut wire (replaced)
9/10/2001	Wildcat Ridge	N/A	Wildcat Ridge gate	N/A	BLM discovered during weekly patrol, fence cut, repaired

Incident Date	Range Name	MPR	Location	Suspects	Disposition
9/18/2001	Impossible Cany	N/A	Wolf Hill Parking	N/A	Four strands of barbed wire on the right side of gate cut, three strands of barbed wire cut on left side of gate
9/24/2001	Impossible Cany	N/A	Impossible Canyon Gate	N/A	Cut wires, repaired
9/24/2001	29	N/A	Range 29	N/A	Concertina wire disturbed on left side of gate, DENR staff investigated and found evidence of deer involvement (hair and tracks) at 19 points along South Boundary Road, Concertina wire has been secured, repaired
0/15/2001	Impossible Cany	N/A	Impossible Canyon Gate	N/A	Cut wire along left side of gate, concertina wire to be installed around Wolf Hill Parking area and along gate
2/24/2001	MOUT Site	01772-2001- MP C036	MOUT Site	3 males (17, 18, 20 years of age)	Trespassed into MOUT site (but not into the Multi-Range Area) and was found by military police discharging firearms. Minor released to parent, one transported to county jail, one released with warning
2/19/2002	South Boundary		Range 28 and 29	N/A	South Boundary Road across from Antennas and Water tank between Range 28 and 29, wire raised and tied


Incident Date	Range Name	MPR	Location	Suspects	Disposition
2/25/2002	Watkins Gate	N/A	Watkins Gate and Austin Road	N/A	Mountain Bicycle tracks (2 sets). The bicycle tracks were first noticed at the intersection of Watkins Gate Road and the Austin Road Firebreak. The tracks continues South on Austin Road; East on Phoenix Road; and Southeast on Foul Bore Road. The evidenc
3/14/2002	Range 21	N/A	Range 21 pad	1 Male	Individual was first seen bicycling up to Range 21 road from Gen Jim Moore Rd., it is assumed that the individual climbed the MRA gate. Individual said he was bored and he does this all the time (This may explain prior bicycle tracks). Observed near Ran
5/28/2002	Barloy Canyon		Along Barloy Canyon	N/A	3 wires broken, 25 wire clips removed along Barloy Canyon; I think this was all due to the fire line mowing.
6/10/2002	Range 30 and 31	N/A	South Boundary Road between Range 30 and 31	N/A	Wire and concertina wire hooked up clips removed. Recently mowed area no distinct trail from trespasser.
7/18/2003	NA	NA	Eucalyptus Road between Parker flats and Heineken Road	NA	This incident occurred on Eucalyptus Road between Parker flats and Heineken Road involving a off-road vehicle stuck in the sand.
2/17/2003	23	NA	General Jim Moore Blvd and Watkins Gate Road	3-4 teenage children, ages 14-15.	John Hernandez noticed the children climbing over the 4-strand fence going into the MRA. When he stopped his vehicle and yelled at them they ran towards the City of Seaside.

Incident Date	Range Name	MPR	Location	Suspects	Disposition
1/20/2004	NA	NA	Barloy Canyon Rd. Adjacent to Skyline Rd.	Hurlburt, Todd G	Vehicle had driven off of road into ditch and got stuck. There was no damage to government property.
2/8/2004	NA	NA	General Jim Moore Blvd 150 feet north of San Pablo Gate	Cabrera, Gabriel D	Vehicle skid off road. Driver hit an object in the road travelling southbound. Brakes locked up and vehicle skid.
8/25/2004	NA	NA	Intersection of Gen. Jim Moore Blvd and South Boundary Rd.	NA	The top two strands of the four stran barbed wire fence and concertina wire were cut allowing access to the habitat area and ultimately the impact area. A trail into the vegetation is visible from the road. A message was left for Denny (BLM) with the location of the hole in the fence so the breach area could be identified. The breach of the barbed wire was not present on 8-24-04.
4/21/2005	26 & 27	NA	Austin Rd, Grid 27	NA	Climed the fence at the intersection of South Boundary Rd and Austin Rd. 2.36" High Explosive Anti-tank Rocket was missing. The item was at the location on April 20th, 2005. Two sets of tennis shoe tracks discovered.
4/25/2005	37	na	Riso Ridge, Grid 97	NA	Two mountain bike tracks and shoe prints were visible. The tracks were followed on the following connecting roads:Riso Ridge, Hawkeye Rd, and Orion Rd towards South Boundary Rd. Poit of entry unknown.



Incident Date	Range Name	MPR	Location	Suspects	Disposition
4/25/2005	NA	NA	Watkins Gate Rd near Orion Rd	NA	One set of running shoe tracks were visible. The tracks headed west on Watkins Gate Rd. Point of entry unknown.
5/13/2005	NA	NA	South Boundary Rd and Gen. Jim Moore Blvd in the vicinity of "No Parking" sign	NA	Third wire cut. Trail found from the cut into Impact Area.
5/13/2005	NA	NA	Gen. Jim Moore Blvd at Seaside City Limits sign	NA	Third wire slack. Trail found up to power tower.
5/13/2005	NA	NA	Barloy Cyn Rd. 250 meters north of Range 32 gate	NA	Top wire slack. Middle wire loose from two posts. Grass knocked down on interior side.
5/21/2005	NA	NA	Range Gate at Wildcat Ridge Rd and Barloy Cyn Rd	NA	Third wire of fence slacked. Crushed grass path from the right side of the gate heading west into the Impact Area.
6/14/2005	Range 45	01121-2005	Range 45, Eucalyptus Rd @ Parker Flats Cutoff	none	Sift Area vandalism. Loader stolen and driven into reservoir. Fence, truck, trailer were destroyed.

LEVELS OF SITE SECURITY

MONTEREY BAY



Concertina Wire	Munitions Response Sites
Fort Ord Boundary	Levels of Site Security
Major Roads	Level A (IA)
Secondary Roads	Level B (Restricted MRS)
Fuel Breaks	Level C
Facilities	Trespassing Incidents
Barbed Wire	Year
Gates	1998
Cable	1999
Cattle	2000
Chain Link	2001
Signs	2002
General Info	2003
Information Board	2004
BLM Kiosk	2005
IA Warning	



**FORMER FORT ORD
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

PRINT DATE: Apr 05, 2006 at 12:01 PM	SOURCE OF DATA: Fort Ord MMRP Database
AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY:	SCALE:
DRAWN BY: Cary A.Siebel@usace.army.mil	
FILE: GIS_ProjectMM_SecurityMM_site_security B-size.mxd	

Attachment 4

1998 - 2005 Incidental MEC Report



Date	MM Item Description	Quantity	Reporting Agency	MM Type
6/17/1998	PRACTICE LANDMINE (Model Unknown)	1	BLM	MD-E
10/14/1998	HAND, GRENADE, MKII	1	BLM	ISD
1/26/1999	SMOKE, GRENADE, M18	1	BLM	MD-E
2/10/1999	SLAP FLARE, M127	1	BLM	ISD
2/10/1999	SMOKE, GRENADE	1	BLM	ISD
4/6/1999	SLAP FLARE	1	BLM	ISD
4/22/1999	5.56MM		BLM	SAA
6/7/1999	AP WITH TRACER, 90MM, M77	1	IT	MD-E
7/14/1999	CARTRIDGE, 40MM, M576, PROJECTILE ONLY	1	CMS	MD-E
8/25/1999	ROCKET, 2.36 INCH	1	CMS	MD-E
10/18/1999	SMOKE, GRENADE	1	BLM	MD-E
10/28/1999	SMOKE, GRENADE, M18	1	BLM	MD
12/1/1999	SIGL, CARTRIDGE, 40MM	1	IT	MD-E
2/3/2000	PRACTICE, GRENADE, MK II	1	IT	MD-E
2/8/2000	MINE, APERS, PRACTICE, M8	1	BLM	MD-E
2/28/2000	ROCKET MOTOR, 3.5 INCH	1	IT	MD-E
2/28/2000	.30CAL BLANKS	84	IT	MD

Date	MM Item Description	Quantity	Reporting Agency	MM Type
2/28/2000	PROJECTILE, 37MM (1 Pounder)	1	BLM	UXO
2/28/2000	.30CAL BLANKS	500	IT	MD-E
2/29/2000	SEVERAL PIECES OF LOOSE PYROTECHNIC MATERIA	1	IT	UXO
2/29/2000	SLAP FLARES (UNFIRED)	3	IT	UXO
3/9/2000	MINE, APERS, M16, PLASTER TRAINING AID	1	BLM	MD
4/5/2000	PRACTICE, GRENADE	1	IT	UXO
5/1/2000	ROCKET MOTOR, 3.5 INCH	1	IT	MD-E
5/25/2000	SMOKE, GRENADE	1	BLM	MD-E
5/25/2000	FUZE, GRENADE, M205	1	BLM	UXO
6/21/2000	MINE, AT, PRACTICE, M20	1	BLM	MD-E
6/28/2000	SMOKE, GRENADE, M18	1	BLM	MD-E
7/5/2000	RIFLE, GRENADE, SMOKE, STREAMER, M23A1	1	BLM	MD-E
7/13/2000	GRENADE, HAND, PRACTICE, M62	1	IT	MD-E
7/14/2000	GRENADE, SMOKE, M18 (COLOR UNKNOWN)	1	IT	MD-E
7/17/2000	GRENADE, SMOKE, M18 (COLOR UNKNOWN)	1	IT	MD-E
9/7/2000	CASING, 40MM	1	HLA	MD-E
9/27/2000	EOD TRAINING WARHEAD, B31A (Model Unknown)	1	BLM	MD
10/10/2000	SMOKE POT, M10	3	BLM	MD-E
11/27/2000	FIN ASSEMBLY FOR 3.5 INCH ROCKET	1	IT	MD-E

Date	MM Item Description	Quantity	Reporting Agency	MM Type
12/10/2000	SIGL, ILLUMINATION, GROUND, PARACHUTES, RED STA	1	POM-A PD	ISD
12/14/2000	BARRAGE, ROCKET, 4.5 INCH, MK 1	1	IT	MD-E
1/9/2001	SIMULATOR, PROJECTILE, AIRBURST, M74	1	BLM	MD-E
3/13/2001	FLARE, CASING, EMPTY (Model Unknown)	1	IT	MD
3/15/2001	GRENADE, PRACTICE, M69	1	BLM	UXO
3/27/2001	STOKES, MORTARS, 3 INCH, MK 1 (UNFUZED) FILLER	1	BLM	MD-E
3/27/2001	STOKES, MORTARS, 3 INCH, MK 1 (UNFUZED) FILLER	1	BLM	MD-E
4/3/2001	STOKES, MORTAR, 3 INCH, MK 1	1	BLM	MD-E
6/18/2001	ROCKET, MOTORS, 3.5 INCH	2	BLM	MD-E
6/19/2001	GRENADE, RIOT CONTROL, CIVILIAN (Model Unknown)	1	BLM	MD-E
7/1/2001	ROCKET, PRACTICE, HEAT, 3.5 INCH, M29	1	DENR	MD-E
7/3/2001	BALL, 7.62MM, 38 RDS M/G BELT (LIVE SMALL ARMS	1	BLM	SAA
7/11/2001	GRENADE, SMOKE, M18	1	BLM	MD-E
8/7/2001	PRACTICE, 81MM, M43	3	BLM	MD
8/21/2001	SIGL, ILLUMINATION, FLARE, CASING, SLAP, M126A1	1	IT	MD
9/5/2001	CIVILIAN, TEAR GAS, GRENADE (Model Unknown)	1	BLM	MD-E
9/20/2001	SMOKE, GRENADE, M18	1	BLM	MD-E
9/26/2001	SIMULATOR, FLASH, M110	1	BLM	UXO
11/27/2001	GRENADE, HAND, PRACTICE, M62	1	PARSONS	UXO

Date	MM Item Description	Quantity	Reporting Agency	MM Type
2/20/2002	75MM, MK I HE PROJECTILE	1	FOR A	UXO
3/12/2002	CARTRIDGE, 40MM, MULTIPROJECTILE, M576 (Model	1	PARSONS	UXO
4/23/2002	GRENADE, SMOKE, M18	1	BLM	MD-E
4/23/2002	POSSIBLE SMOKE GRENADE	1	BLM	MD-E
10/30/2002	ROCKET, 3.5 INCH, PRACTICE, M29 SERIES	1	BLM	MD-E
1/22/2003	Signal, Ground Expeded	1	USACE	MD-E
2/3/2003	Cartridge, 20mm, TP-T, M220	17	SEASIDE PD	DMM
6/9/2003	GRENADE RIFLE SMOKE M22	1	BLM	MD
6/10/2003	M29 RIFLE GRENADE, INERT PRACTICE	1	BLM	MD
6/23/2003	Detonating Cord, PETN (Primacord)	1	Shaw E & I	UXO
6/27/2003	2.75 INCH ROCKET WARHEAD	1	BLM	MD
9/9/2003	Grenade, Smoke M18	1	BLM	MD-E
9/16/2003	Civillian flash bang model 7290 (Model Unknown)	1	Marina Coast Water	MD-E
12/17/2003	Projo, 90 mm, AP-T, M138 Series (expended)	1	Parsons	MD-E
5/10/2004	37mm Projectile M55 Practice (Inert)	1	Pinnacle	MD
5/10/2004	30mm Projectile M788 Practice (Inert)	1	Pinnacle	MD
9/14/2004	Simulator, Projectile Air Burst M74A1	1	BLM	MD-E
10/7/2004	Practice, AT Rifle Grenade, M29	1	BLM	MD-E
12/14/2004	Zinc base of a 40mm M781 practice grenade	1	BLM	MD

Date	MM Item Description	Quantity	Reporting Agency	MM Type
1/10/2005	SIMULATOR, Projectile, Air Burst M74A1	1	BLM	MD-E
1/10/2005	A type of roller off a military vehicle.	1	BLM	RRD
3/18/2005	Cartridge, 40mm, HE, M406	1	Mont. Pen. Eng.	DMM
4/8/2005	Signal, illumination, ground, M131	1	Dawn REIS Ecologi	DMM
5/17/2005	Grenade, Rifle, Smoke M22	1	Shaw Environmental	MD
5/30/2005	Projectile, 75mm, Shrapnel, MK I	1	Declined	MD
5/30/2005	Fuze, projectile, combination, M1907	1	Declined	MD
7/27/2005	Cap, blasting, electric, M6	6	Shaw Environmental	DMM
10/3/2005	Mine, antitank, practice, M20	1	Shaw Environmental	MD



INCIDENTAL MILITARY MUNITIONS 1998-2005

Fort Ord Boundary
 [Dashed line symbol]

BLM Boundary
 [Dotted pattern symbol]

Major Roads
 [Thick solid line symbol]


Secondary Roads
 [Thin solid line symbol]

Incidental MM 1998-2005 TYPE

- [Green vertical bar] Insufficient Source Data
- [Blue vertical bar] Munitions Debris
- [Blue vertical bar with horizontal lines] Munitions Debris Expended
- [Yellow vertical bar] Small Arms
- [Red vertical bar] UXO

Munitions Response Sites Levels of Site Security

- [Pink box] Level A (IA)
- [Orange box] Level B (Restricted MRS)
- [Yellow box] Level C




 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS

**FORMER FORT ORD
 MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

DESIGNED BY: Cary S.

PRINT DATE: Feb 08, 2006 at 12:23 PM

AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY: SCALE: 1:59,633

SOURCE OF DATA: Fort Ord MMRP Database

FILE: GIS_ProjectMM_Security\mm incidentals b-size 010306.mxd