Prescribed Burn Site (Munitions Response Site (MRS)-16) Security After Action Report

1. PURPOSE

This report provides a description of the design and implementation of site security procedures and resulting issues associated with the prescribed burn of the MRS-16 area conducted on October 19, 2006.

REFERENCES: WORK PLAN MRS-16 MUNTIONS AND EXPLOSIVES OF CONCERN REMOVAL, APPENDIX K - PRESCRIBED BURN PLAN, ATTACHMENT C - SITE SECURITY PLAN

2. RESPONSIBILITIES

The Presidio of Monterey Police Department (POM PD), in conjunction with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Munitions and Explosives of Concern Safety Specialist (MECSS), were responsible for public safety and security as it applied to the subject burn area, key movement corridors, personnel, equipment, and associated facilities during the prescribed burn action. The MECSS was responsible for overseeing the security within MRS-16 with input and support from the POM Police to include designation and enforcement of the exclusion zone.

3. PLANNING

Prior to the publication of the prescribed burn plan, the POM Police and the USACE MECSS provided input to the Presidio of Monterey Fire Department (POM FD) in the development of the site security plan attachment. All elements of the site security plan were subject to the approval of Chief, POM FD as the incident commander.

The following areas were assessed:

- Protests or other attempts to interfere with the prescribed burn
- Media operations and safety
- Emergency and contingency operations for rescue and public safety in event of a breakout, injury, or other unplanned event(s)
- Security breach response
- Authorized personnel identification procedures
- Exclusion Zone safety and control requirements

4. IMPLEMENTATION

4.1 Site Security

4.1.1 Pre-Burn Activities

POM PD increased security patrols in the vicinity of the burn area (Parker Flats, Watkins Gate, and Eucalyptus Roads) 48 hours prior to the anticipated burn day. Warning signs were posted at all major roads and trails intersecting the perimeter of an 800-ft exclusion zone around the burn area describing the pending exclusion requirements. An activist/protester area was designated.

4.1.2 Burn Day Activities

Approximately 2-hours before ignition, police and security personnel involved in the prescribed burn received their final briefing. The USACE MECSS and POM PD patrolled roads within, and surrounding, the burn area to ensure that no trespassers, activists, or member of the public were present. Closure barricades were positioned as roads were patrolled, and roving patrols began on closed roadways. A controlled entry point was established for ingress/egress of the exclusion zone using previously developed authorized personnel identification procedures. The incident commander was informed when the exclusion zone was secured.

- 4.1.2.1 The security of the exclusion zone was maintained until the incident commander and the USACE MECSS determined that the hazard of incidental detonations was passed. Security escort was provided to a media pool accompanied by a BRAC/POM media coordinator to and from a designated media overlook per the media access plan (see MEDIA NOTIFICATION/RELOCATION AFTER ACTION REPORT). Roadways were opened when the "all clear" was signaled.
- 4.1.2.2 No demonstrations or disruptions were observed. No security breaches were recorded. The exclusion zone was not compromised during burn operations.
 - 4.1.2.3 No contingency operations were initiated.
 - 4.1.2.4 Security operations were terminated with the "all clear" signal.